local government. Although often remaining the single most important player in regeneration, authorities must perforce negotiate with an increasing range of other official or quasi-official organisations:`steering not rowing' (Osbourne and Gaebler, 1992) . Partnership working has been generally welcomed (Audit Commission, 2002a) . It has been seen as a mechanism for creating synergy across agencies, and providing a source of additional investment over and above enhanced expenditure flowing from ABI designation (SEU, 2000) . In part this move towards interagency cooperation has been driven by concerns that deprived areas do not receive their full share of resources through`mainstream' investment. Where research has attempted to explore the complex question of investment in small deprived areas, the limited evidence which is available suggests that disadvantaged wards receive more`defensive social security investment' than do more prosperous wards, but no more, or even less, expenditure in areas such as education, health, and economic investment (DETR, 1998a) .
However, partnership working has attracted its fair share of criticism. There are, for example,``concerns about partnership overload, the amount of additional bureaucracy and, in some cases a lack of integration between initiatives dealing with the same problem or the same client group'' (RCU, 2002, page 1). Some arrangements are seen as little more than partnerships of convenience designed to satisfy requisite funding arrangements (Cochrane et al, 1996) . The degree to which partnerships are of themselves able to change attitudes or activities has been raised by others (Lawless, 1994) . In the light of these difficulties it is not surprising to see that by 2002 central government was beginning to rationalise the role and remit of partnerships (RCU, 2002) .
Finally there is the broader question surrounding the complexity of ABI policy. If we take the longer view comparing, say, the late 1990s and early 2000s with equivalent experience ten years earlier, we can see that the policy framework within which ABIs operate has become more diffuse and complex. There are more ABIs and they cover a wider range of outcome areas, including health, crime, and education. For much of the 1980s a small number of discrete ABIs, notably Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), dominated area-based regeneration. A decade later, one review of coordination across ABIs identified at least nine major, and a number of smaller, initiatives impacting on six deprived case-study localities in England (NRU, 2002) . These included interventions as diverse as Health Action Zones, Education Action Zones, Sure Start, Employment Zones, Single Regeneration Budget (SRB), Crime Reduction Programmes, and so on. In part this is a consequence of the widely held view that key initiatives of the 1980s, notably UDCs, were too narrow in their remit, because of their focus on economic and physical development (Brownhill, 1990) . Successful urban regeneration is generally perceived as requiring a comprehensive approach able to deal with a commensurately complex interplay of social, economic, and environmental problems. This drift to more diverse ABIs also reflects the willingness on the part of the incoming Labour government, elected in 1997, to embrace a range of inherently`wicked' problems such as social exclusion (SEU, 1998) and social capital (PIU, 2002) . Complex difficulties and constraints evident within deprived areas are likely to require complex solutions.
The new urban policy agenda: the role of New Deal for Communities New Deals for Communities (NDCs), launched in Autumn 1998, were designed tò`h elp turn around the poorest neighbourhoods'' (DETR, 1998b, page 1) . The origins to the programme lay in the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review which announced a New Deal for Regeneration, one central element of which was to be NDC (HM Treasury, 1998) . This new ABI was in turn informed by the Social Exclusion Unit's Report Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (SEU, 1998) which argued, that despite many years of area regeneration policies there remained at least 4000 multiply deprived neighbourhoods in England. NDC was hence to be an instrument through which``to reduce the gaps between some of the poorest neighbourhoods and the rest of the country'' (DETR, 2001a, page 2). NDC Partnerships were established in thirty-nine locations across England, to devise and implement tenyear strategies to reduce disadvantage in some of the most severely deprived of localities. An initial tranche of seventeen Round-1 Pathfinders was announced in 1998; a further twenty-two Round-2 NDCs a year later. Ten NDCs are located in London, two in Birmingham, and the rest in major cities and towns across England. Programme-wide funding is to amount to over »2 billion for the full ten years, and there will be additional investment from other public and private sector sources. Individual NDC allocations against approved delivery plans vary from about »35 million in the case of Norwich to some »61 million for Kensington in Liverpool.
The design features underpinning NDC reveal differences when compared with other previous ABIs such as City Challenge and SRB. NDCs are, for instance, intended to attack problems within relatively small areas consisting of between 1000 and 4000 dwellings and over longer time periods than has traditionally been the case. The focus within NDC on a relatively small number of localities contrasts sharply with SRB, the six rounds of which supported more than 1000 schemes (DTLR, 2002) . It is clear too that NDC is intended to attack a comprehensive array of problems in that partnerships have been encouraged to identify outcomes in relation to five policy areas: health, education, crime, worklessness, and housing and the physical environment. This explicit designation of predefined outcomes has not generally been evident in most ABIs.
NDC: the national evaluation
In 2001 the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU) (then in the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions and from 2002 in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister), commissioned a consortium of some fourteen academic and consultancy organisations headed by the Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research to undertake a national evaluation of NDC. This initial phase of the evaluation is to last until 2005.
The evaluation is intended both to undertake what might be seen as traditional evaluation tasks, but is also to assist all thirty-nine partnerships with their delivery plans. In time it is quite possible that this twofold function of support and evaluation will become difficult to sustain. By 2002 it was becoming evident that a small number of NDC Partnerships were running into problems. This raises a dilemma for the national evaluation team: in the interests of the evaluation's support role, should efforts be made to`dampen down' what might otherwise be seen as critical annual reports? The evaluation is also very much about enhancing the evidence base. The 2001 A Review of the Evidence Base for Regeneration Policy and Practice (DETR, 2001b) pointed to a paucity of evidence exploring ABIs and long-term outcomes. The NDC evaluation is designed to help plug that gap. But this objective too is likely to cause its own tensions in that outcomes in areas such as health and education will take years to unfold.
During the period April 2002 to March 2003 the evaluation team as a whole undertook a range of tasks of which three were of particular importance. A household questionnaire was devised to establish a`base-line' in all thirty-nine partnerships. This addressed sociodemographic, status, and attitudinal considerations across the five key outcome areas. Administered by MORI and NOP it was based on a random survey design and culminated in 500 responses from each of the thirty-nine NDC areas.
The intention is that this will be repeated in 2004, when efforts will also be made to trace a proportion of those moving out of NDC areas. A second major task involved the collation and analysis of an increasing portfolio of secondary and administrative data by the Social Disadvantage Research Centre (SDRC) at Oxford University. This included, for each partnership area, 1999^2001 change data in relation to worklessness and benefit claimants, rates of staying in education after the age of 16, acceptance into higher education, a number of health, mortality, and illness indicators, and so on. The range of NDC specific secondary data is still relatively limited but it will increase considerably, ultimately providing a rich array of data, although probably relatively less for housing and crime than for other theme areas. To assist in the analysis of both primary and secondary data, groupings of thirty-nine`comparator' wards have been identified. Within these areas some fifty responses to the MORI/NOP household survey were obtained, together with equivalent ward-based secondary and administrative data. These comparator area data will provide benchmarks against which to assess change at the NDC programme level.
The third major data analysis task surrounded the production of thirty-nine NDC reports. These were designed to reflect on process issues such as the robustness of partnership, barriers to delivery, interagency cooperation, involvement of black and minority ethnic (BME) communities, and community engagement. In order to ensure consistency, partnership-level data was collected through a series of standard templates. Typically these were completed by members of the national evaluation team and/or NDC Partnership staff following some fifteen to twenty interviews with two sets of key players: those working directly with and/or employed by partnerships, who are referred to as`partnership' below; and also stakeholder representatives from partner agencies, referred to as`stakeholder agencies'. Examples of stakeholder agencies typically include the police, Primary Care Trusts, JobCentre Plus, and those holding executive positions in local authority education, regeneration, and housing departments. This paper draws on evidence emerging from all aspects of the national evaluation. Thanks are due to all members of the evaluation team who are listed in the 2002/03 Annual Report (NRU, 2003a) . The empirical material used in this paper is outlined in the Annual Report. These data can best be explored within the three overarching themes flagged up in the introduction to this paper: community engagement, partnership working, and programme cohesion and complexity.
The NDC programme and community engagement The NDC experiment has a central commitment to`communities' which in practice tend to be defined, if only implicitly, as local residents and their immediate social infrastructure. In this respect, there are strong elements of continuity from previous ABIs, notably SRB (DETR, 1998c) and City Challenge (DETR, 1999) . But the overriding emphasis on community engagement gives NDC a slightly different flavour to previous initiatives. This is manifest in several ways. The initiative is seen as likely to fail if it is not built on genuine partnerships involving local residents and others (DETR, 1998b) . Residents are to be involved in activities across the board:``NDC partnerships and programmes are being driven by their communities, and residents are fully involved in the planning and delivery of NDC programmes'' (DETR, 2001c, page 11) . Efforts are to be made to employ local residents wherever possible (DETR, 2000a) . In one respect in particular, NDC has made a more specific effort than previous ABIs to engage with a traditionally marginalised sector; BME communities. Although by 2002, race equality was being mainstreamed across neighbourhood renewal as a whole (ODPM, 2002), NDC was already majoring on this two years earlier (DETR, 2000b).
Work undertaken on the national evaluation during 2002/03 allows three`community engagement' issues to be unpacked: perceptions as to progress in the area; barriers and constraints; and BME communities in the programme.
Perceptions of change
One of the main objectives of local evaluation work undertaken during 2002/03 was to establish theöpotentially contrastingöviews between partnerships and stakeholder agencies. Virtually all of the work undertaken by the national evaluation team pointed to the latter being less optimistic about progress and change than were partnerships. This was evident in relation to perceptions of community involvement. To give two examples. Thirteen partnerships think that at least 75% of local community groups are involved with the local NDC. This view is shared by stakeholder agencies in only eight NDC areas. And when asked if there had been any increase in community involvement in areas such as strategic planning, project development, and delivery, partnerships are consistently more optimistic in their views than are stakeholder agencies, as figure 1 makes clear.
Constraints on community engagement
Whatever the merits of these different perceptions of change it is obvious that, in line with experience elsewhere, NDCs run into a series of barriers and tensions when attempting to engage local communities. Some of these concerns relate to definitional considerations. What is the local community? NDCs tend, if only implicitly, to see this as local residents. In line with a long-standing tradition there tends to be less interest in, and engagement with, other groups such as the voluntary sector and business (ODPM, 2003) . But problems of engagement may well encompass a wider clientele. One NDC employee commented that``the whole community is hard to reach''.
Of course, engagement is only one step in the process. Once`engaged' representatives and leaders from communities can be involved in a wide range of tasks designed to support change on the ground. There does appear to be a genuine sentiment on the part both of partnerships and of stakeholder agencies that community involvement can help delivery. Both sectors indicate that`community involvement in planning/delivery' is one of the three (of almost twenty) factors which most encourage delivery. But however plausible that perception may be, the reality is that, once people have been engaged, the standard litany of difficulties tends to undermine longer term commitment: burnout, declining interest, intracommunity strife, disquiet at the operation of formal boards, lack of remuneration, formidable time commitments, lack of confidence, lack of perceived skills, and so on. None of this should be seen as at all surprising. NDCs operate in some of the most deprived areas in England. The SDRC has`reconstituted' NDC areas as wards and ranked these within the framework set by the Index for Multiple Deprivation. Twenty nine of the thirty-nine NDC areas would fall within the 10% most deprived wards in England and all but two within the most deprived 20%. These are disadvantaged areas where there has often been a steady deterioration in economic opportunities and social infrastructure. Partly as result, residents tend to lose a degree of trust in local institutions. Figure 2 indicates the percentage of respondents who say they have a`great deal' or a`fair amount' of trust in local organisations. NDCs are seen with local councils as amongst the least trustworthy of organisations, partly no doubt because there is a frequent confusion of the two. Interestingly, where national benchmarks exist, levels of trust in all organisations is lower amongst NDC residents than is the case nationally.
This understandable tendency to equate the NDC with the`local council' is perhaps confirmed in figure 3 which outlines the percentage of those who, having heard of the local partnership, have`a great deal' or a`fair amount' of trust in it. The range of responses, from 18% to 62%, is remarkable. It is also intriguing to see the low figure for Walsall, located as it is in an authority with well-known problems.
NDCs and BME communities
As mentioned above, no ABI has ever placed as much emphasis on BME communities as has NDC. One obvious reason for this is sheer size of this community. Across all NDC areas 24% of survey respondents are from BME communities. In eight NDC areas more than 50% of respondents are from BME communities. In twenty-two localities, NDCs accommodate higher BME populations than districts within which they are located. In Birmingham Aston the BME population (78% of respondents) is 48 percentage points higher than for Birmingham. Alternatively, in Leicester Braunstone the BME population at 4% is 32 percentage points lower than for the city as whole. Race becomes an issue for NDCs in a way which has probably not been true for any previous ABI. In response, many partnerships have placed a considerable stress on engaging with local BME groups. To give just two examples, Hackney has developed outreach programmes for Turkish and Kurdish groups, and Sandwell has instigated capacity-building and capital projects for Yemeni, Sikh, and Bangladeshi groups. But problems remain. In the twelve months up to November 2002, BME representation on boards increased by 16%. But in twenty-six cases there are still fewer BME representatives than local BME populations would suggest. One reason for this may be that partnerships have had problems in engaging with all of the BME groups in their locality. Stakeholder agencies in thirty-one NDC areas think that the local partnership has engaged with fewer than 50% of existing BME groups. Engagement with, and the involvement of, BME communities may also be made more complex by an influx of asylum seekers into some NDC areas: 3% of respondents to the household survey indicate that they have applied for refugee status. Three quarters of refugees are not white. Partly as a consequence, about 15% of respondents across NDC areas indicate that English is not their first language. These trends of changing population and associated language barriers are bound to impact on BME engagement.
But some partnerships could do more. One third did not have a race-equalities strategy or policy in late 2002. Many have not instigated effective systems which would allow them to monitor trends such as the ethnicity of their own employees or assumed beneficiaries of projects which they sponsor. There can be attitudinal problems too. A handful of partnerships with low BME populations indicate``it's not a problem for us''. At least one London partnership alternatively suggests it needs do no more becausè`r ace is mainstreamed anyway''. And several partnerships indicate their concerns at presenting projects primarily designed for local BME communities to a wider, mainly white, population.
Partnership working and the NDC programme
The design of NDC is fundamentally rooted in partnership working:``The NDCs will fail if bids are not built on genuine partnership. We want local people, local businesses, community and voluntary organisations, schools and further education colleges, local authorities and public agencies to work together in inclusive partnerships'' Most partnerships appear reasonably confident that they have secured appropriate stakeholder involvement. Inevitably experience varies. One or two have received little formal board commitment on the part of key agencies. Most have, however, gained representation from key agencies to mirror the five outcome areas. Typically partnership boards include representation from the police, the Primary Care Trust (PCT), a local authority or housing association representative, chief education officer, and perhaps a contact from JobCentre Plus. Others look to senior local authority personnel and local councillors. Typically boards tend to be chaired by a`community leader', although there are examples of independent chairs, often brought in as a result of locally contentious circumstances. Boards preside over the ten-year strategic planning of the area, liaise with the Government Office in relation to implementational issues, and encourage stakeholder agency commitment into the area.
The perceived benefits of partnership working
There is evidence to point to the direct benefits of working with other agencies. Expenditure data for 2001/02 is available from some nineteen NDCs. This suggests that partnership spending of »32 million was supported by »27 million from elsewhere, mainly`other public' sources. It is not currently possible to indicate what proportion of this latter investment would have occurred irrespective of NDC designation. More reflectively, agencies were asked about the impact on their own activities and attitudes as a result of working in partnership with NDCs. For this analysis alone agencies were divided into two: stakeholder agencies represented on NDC boards, and`other agencies' in the area which although aware of the NDC tended to have few direct dealings with it. The exact composition of`other agencies' varied across partnerships but tended to include Learning and Skills Councils (LSCs), Regional Development Agencies, and some local authority departments such as planning and social services. Results are shown in figure 4. Both sets of agencies are generally positive about the experience of partnership working, especially in relation to strategic development and joint project planning. But interestingly there is a widespread perception that partnership working has not had the same impact on the business end of regeneration: match funding, mainstreaming, and improving service delivery. There is perhaps some evidence here for the view that partnerships can become talking shops, achieving little of substance over and above what would have happened anyway. More`other agencies' actually think partnership working has reduced mainstream funding into the NDC area than increased it.
Tensions in partnership working
Despite local evidence of joint working, it is clear that partnership working is constrained by a series of barriers and tensions. There appear to be four impulses at work here. First, the role of individuals can be decisive. Local authority departmental heads, chief executives, and senior agency staff may sit on NDC boards, providing them with real clout. But individuals at this level also have the power to move on. One LSC chief executive withdrawing from the board of an NDC commented:``I never knew what they [local resident board members] wanted from us.'' Second, it may be that the intrinsic nature of the service militates against ABIs. For instance, several observers suggest that the relative lack of involvement of local social services departments is a result of their emphasis on individuals and families, rather than area-based deprivation. Third, partnership working can be affected by organisational change. realised the opportunities which NDCs provide to attack crime in some of the most deprived of localities. Other interpretations have been mooted, including police identifying NDC funds as a source of additional spend or as one police board member commented``our Chief Constable likes people to have community policing on their CV.'' But whatever has driven this commitment, wider policy changes can ultimately undermine it. The emphasis placed on national floor targets such as reducing burglary can lead to a reorientation of policy priorities away from issues of vandalism and teenagers on the street, consistently rated as the most pressing issues by NDC residents. And fourth, partnerships were also asked about the degree to which agencies were engaging in a range of mainstreaming activities, such as bending projects or resources towards the NDC area, using the NDC Delivery Plan to inform and influence their own activities, supporting projects, and so on. Other recent work has shown the sheer complexities inherent in mainstreaming, in the sense of providing additional resources and/or better services to defined ABIs (Audit Commission, 2002b; NRU, 2002) . In general, the evidence from this evaluation confirms this latter view. Some partnerships indicate that mainstream agencies may have actually reduced expenditure to the now apparently`cash-rich' NDC areas.`Cultural barriers' within mainstream organisations may inhibit spatial thinking. There may also be a lack of organisational capacity within stakeholder agencies through which to provide a`bespoke and flexible' service to NDC areas. And, although those wielding executive authority often indicate broad support for NDCs, those lower down the chain of command may be less enthusiastic.
The NDC programme: cohesion and complexity
In some respects the NDC programme has achieved a great deal. Despite vagaries along the way, there remains commitment to all thirty-nine initiatives. Early expenditure patterns had to be reprofiled when it became evident programme-wide investment would tend to be loaded towards the end of the ten-year programme. But reprofiled expenditure of »80 million was spent in 2001/02 and more than twice that figure the following year. Partnerships, working in conjunction with partner agencies, have instigated literally hundreds of projects. Yet doubts remain about whether the sheer complexities of the programme will ultimately undermine its ambition. These concerns fall into two categories: strategic and operational.
Strategy in planning
The assumption has been that the NDC boards should adopt a strategic approach to the replanning of their localities. Ideally this should involve a careful consideration of alternative options, a justified selection of outcomes, and defined pathways leading from concise and evidenced baseline problems, through projects and milestones to quantifiable outcomes (DETR, 2000c; 2001e) . At least in principle, this reflects other guidance stressing the need for ABIs to take a longer term view and to locate their activities within wider policy and spatial markets (English Partnerships et al, 2001; HM Treasury, 2000) . However, there is a sense that longer term planning at the partnership scale is characterised by ad-hoc, reactive decisions rather than by any sense of rationality. This emerges in three ways.
First, resident-led boards reveal an enthusiasm for`safe and clean' quick wins on projects, such as environmental cleanup schemes, and less interest in themes such as education and health. Evidence available on spending by outcome theme for 2001/02 indicated that at that stage health had attracted least commitment.
Second, planning needs to be informed by rigorous baselines. During the early scoping phase of the evaluation, some nineteen NDC baselines were analysed in detail. There are well-understood problems which have traditionally impaired small-area data analysis (SEU, 2001b) . These constraints were evident in many NDC baselines. There was then a lack of secondary and administrative data appropriate to these small nonstandardised' localities. This can be an especially severe problem in dealing with issues such as educational attainment per pupil where surrogates based on equivalent secondary school data are inappropriate for small areas such as NDCs. Not all partnerships carried out a baseline household survey. When they did so, quality-control problems arose. These included the use of`quotas' which can affect the statistical reliability of results, and the decision by some partnerships to employ local people, which can again create problems in relation to the reliability of data addressing sensitive issues such as income. As an aside it should be stressed that following work undertaken by the Social Exclusion Unit in identifying a lack of neighbourhood-level data (SEU, 2001b) , availability of secondary and administrative data for NDCs and other small-area localities has improved considerably. This trend looks set to continue (NRU, 2003b) .
Third, strategic planning is guided through longer term delivery plans. In order to get NDCs off the ground, interim boards often commissioned consultants to produce plans for approval by the Government Office and central government. Many of these are now outdated as a new generation of plans emerges following a third-year review. It is not yet clear how plausible and realistic this new tranche of plans will prove to be. But the originals had their problems (Hickman, 2001; Sanderson, 2001 ). Many were based on the implementation of specific projects whose relationships either to identified problems or to ultimate outcomes were often unclear. On occasions, partnerships seemed not to have thought out inherent contradictions in proposals. For instance, where outcomes included increasing private sector accommodation or raising house prices, not all had thought through what the implications of these changes would be for existing residents. And many were too ambitious. A desk-based review of plans undertaken in 2002, established that partnerships had identified more than 250 separate outcomes and intended to implement more than 450 projects (CRESR, 2002) . One partnership had identified sixty-nine separate outcomes and the average was more than forty. There must be doubts as to whether any ABI could realistically achieve such a complex range of outcomes and projects or indeed whether there is any evidence base against which to judge the appropriateness of these outcomes and associated projects (DETR, 2001b) .
Operational constraints
A number of operational considerations have constrained activity. Figure 5 (over) tabulates the major constraining factors on delivery according to both partnerships and stakeholder agencies.
Many of these constraints are essentially operational: staffing and other human resource issues, design and implementation of projects, and internal management systems. In discussions with partnerships it became evident that a shortage of suitably qualified and experienced staff was having an impact on delivery across the board. But there are subtle nuances here. London NDCs seem to have particular problems in recruiting staff at all levels; several partnerships identified the marked difficulties in getting people with experience of neighbourhood renewal and health and education; and some partnerships have encountered problems in recruiting or retaining chief executives. This last problem is of concern. Evidence from 2001/02 pointed to a relationship between NDC partnerships lacking a permanent chief executive and underspend.
Staff shortages can in turn impact on the introduction and effective use of internal systems. The thirty-nine evaluation teams thought that risk-management systems were`working well' in less than one quarter of partnerships. Less than a third had introduced an evaluation plan by November 2002. And at that stage only a handful had monitoring systems in place which allowed themöand othersöto be able precisely to indicate total project spending, outputs, beneficiaries, and planned outcomes. Lacking these internal management systems makes it much more difficult for partnerships to be in any position to change what they are doing. As one member of a local evaluation team commented``they are heading where they are going''.
Evaluating NDC 2002/03: discussion Early findings from this evaluation informs three wide debates: institutional issues surrounding the degree to which NDC`fits' the wider policy context; freedoms and controls; and pragmatism versus ideology.
The NDC programme is premised on the assumption that mainstream agencies will remain broadly supportive for fully ten years. This assumption may prove overly optimistic. For instance, immediate national policy demands can make continuing commitment impossible. The major and unanticipated stress in Summer 2002 on attacking street crime temporarily undermined commitments made by some police forces. Prevailing leit-motifs can change. NDC was originally a central component in Labour's`New Deal' commitments of the late 1990s. However, the policy environment has moved on. The Regional Co-ordination Unit has, for instance, made efforts to rationalise what had become a raft of ostensibly confusing ABIs (RCU, 2002 Other institutional issues have come increasingly to constrain the programme. A deepening emphasis is being placed on`better policymaking'. This has become a dominant theme for those working both at the centre (CMPS, 2001 ) and locally (DETR, 2002) . Prima facie, it might be anticipated that ABIs such as NDC can only benefit from macrotrends such as`joined-up policymaking', the use of evidence, and`community planning' (CMPS, 2001; Smith, 2000) . However, at the level of implementation, stress has been placed on processes such as audit (Audit Commission, 2002c) , negotiation amongst agencies and tiers of government, benchmarking, best value, Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), badging, and beacon designation. These concerns are not irrelevant to ABIs. But those majoring on say Best Value, service-level agreements, or the role and remit of LSPs will often at best pay lip-service to ABIs and local services generally. Work at the NDC partnership level in 2002/03 pointed to a dissonance between the neighbourhood-level scale of intervention inherent to NDCs and the district-level intervention central to LSPs. As one member of a local evaluation team commented:``the NDC is additional, not integral, to the LSP''. And as LSPs are increasingly seen as the key forum through which change is to be effected in the delivery of services so NDCs (and other ABIs) are likely to be affected by other trends. Key players in agencies have already started to move`upwards' from NDC boards to the LSP and 90% of NDCs reported changes to board membership in 2002. Perhaps one reason why some agencies may be distancing themselves from NDCs is exactly because they raise specific problems which are intrinsically complex. Achieving effective horizontal integration in any small area of vertically' structured policy streams, operated by different agencies, working to contrasting agendas is difficult to effect. Even if agencies were able to do this in NDCs, there is no guarantee that these lessons can be rolled out across districts: NDCs have odd boundaries, peculiar governance structures, and a captive »50 million. These features do not reflect experience in the vast majority of deprived areas. The total population in all NDC areas is about 430 000. The Social Exclusion Unit argues that at least 4 million live in deprived neighbourhoods. And finally there may be another reason why agencies may be reluctant to invest in NDC areas: lack of a suitable evidence base. A Review of the Evidence Base for Regeneration Policy and Practice concluded that much of the existing evidence was relatively weak, there being in particular a shortage of information on relationships between interventions in ABIs and longer term outcomes (DETR, 2001b) . Given the paucity of the existing evidence base, how can agencies be reassured that interventions in NDC areas will`work'?
A second broad area of debate relates to freedoms and controls. NDCs, in common with all ABIs, are essentially implemented by a dualistic power model: central government lays down the common principles through which the ABI is to be organised, but implementation is undertaken through a local board. What made NDC different was that government was initially prepared to promote more in the way of local freedoms than had usually been the case. This approach certainly loomed large in guidance to the seventeen Round-1 NDCs:``The key to NDC is that it is flexible and very local ...; the very local focus will allow communities to identify closely with the programme and be actively involved'' (DETR, 1998b, page 5). The NRU continues to argue for locally determined solutions to problems evident in NDC localities, but there has been a subtle managerial tightening of the reins. In part, this reflects doubts as to the ability of all partnerships to deliver effective programmes of change. In 2002/03 seven partnerships spent less than 80% of the initial forecast. Six managed to spend less than »2 million. A very small number are encountering severe problems in delivering lasting change.
Nevertheless, changes in how NDC partnerships are to operate have proved gradual rather than seismic. Partnerships have been encouraged to place more emphasis on the evidence base in order to create a more strategic approach and not one driven by the implementation of long-cherished projects; Neighbourhood Renewal Advisers have been trained to provide bespoke guidance; performance banding mechanisms have been made more precise and could ultimately lead to the closure of a few`failing' partnerships; and an increasing emphasis has been placed on a performance management system stressing themes such as leadership, robustness of partnership, interagency working, and, crucially, results. These trends should not be seen as representing a sea change in attitude. But it can be argued that, in its first five years, NDC has evolved from a model based loosely on``decentralisation, local negotiation, and introversion'' to one more clearly rooted in``centrally imposed, locally effected, performance management''.
Finally how does NDC fit within the pragmatism^ideology equation? Everything about the programme (relatively limited spatial coverage; ten-year focus; and emphasis on community engagement and interagency involvement) suggests that efforts to badge it as a`state-sponsored bail-out' are difficult to sustain. Those exploring the role of NDC within the Labour government's National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal are surely correct in identifying it as a pragmatic development of a long-standing reformist policy stream (Hall and Hickman, 2002; Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2001) . NDC fits centrally into that raft of essentially supply-side`New Deal' initiatives which Labour instigated after its 1997 election, designed to reembed individuals and communities within the mainstream. On the wider canvas, it remains a relatively marginal instrument in attacking social deprivation (Oatley, 2000) . Nevertheless, commentators have assessed the degree to which NDC, and more generally Labour's approach to neighbourhood renewal, reflect a`third way' which can be distinguished from the New Right perspective effected by John Major's administration in the early to mid-1990s (Powell, 1999 Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2001 ). There are similarities: the emphasis on market solutions and the search for`consensual' partnerships leap to mind. But there are differences as well. After 1997 there is more of a communitarian feel to urban policy, classically reflected in NDC (Hill, 2000) , and there has also been an attempt to locate NDC within wider conceptualisations of change, notably social exclusion. The agendas assumed of NDC are more explicitly comprehensive than for previous ABIs such as UDCs, City Challenge, or SRB. And, as is evident in, for example, the 2002 Spending Review (HM Treasury, 2002b) , there is a much stronger emphasis on delivery than has been evident in previous ABI policy. Whether these changes after 1997 collectively constitute a definable`New Labour' approach to urban renewal remains debatable. Partnerships operate in a political world where priorities and ministers change and where the drive for`delivery' can vitiate longer term rationality in local policymaking. In political terms this uncertainty has been seen as helping to explain and sustain a form of locality managerialism rooted in an incrementalism designed to`deliver projects' and`spend budget allocations' (Chatterton and Bradley, 2000) . But NDC also provides a potentially more volatile political cauldron, exactly because of the nature of its design: intensive, multiagency, and long term. In this atypical context, those working in, or with, NDCs, and those benefiting from them, have ample opportunity to develop, destroy, recreate, or influence what has already proved in some locations to be an intense local political discourse driven by the rewards embedded within a »50 million locally determined budget. In the longer run, notions of locality based regimes (Miller, 1999) may well prove to be an especially useful device within which to explore changes on the ground. 
